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THE SHRINKING FORUM. THE SUPREME COURT'S
LIMITATION OF JURISDICTION-AN ARGUMENT
FOR A FEDERAL FORUM IN MULTI-PARTY,
MULTI-STATE LITIGATION
ALLEN

R.

KAMP*

INTRODUCTION: THE GOAL OF THE UNITARY FORUM

One of the goals of modern procedure is to provide an adequate
framework for the resolution of all aspects of a controversy The
merger of law and equity, the allowance of inconsistent causes of
action, and the permissive joinder of parties allow modem courts to
resolve all the disputes between all the parties to a controversy I
Unlike older systems of procedure, which often forced the plaintiff
to litigate in either a legal or equitable forum and to maintain separate actions against each defendant, modern procedure enables a
plaintiff to try all of his claims against all defendants at once."
, When the controversy involves many defendants located in several different states, the plaintiff must find a court that may exercise jurisdiction over each defendant. Since repetitive and fragmented litigation is expensive, societal, as well as private, interests
are involved.3 Moreover, each party has a stake in avoiding inconsistent and conflicting judgments.4
The Supreme Court's latest decisions dealing with the jurisdiction of state and federal courts have imperiled the procedural goal
of unity by limiting the courts' jurisdiction over parties either necessary or indispensable to a complete adjudication of a controversy I
Shaffer v. Heitner,6 by recasting prior jurisdictional theories,
adopted a restrictive view of state-court jurisdiction. Kulko v. Superior Court,7 decided in the spring of 1978, followed Shaffer's restric* A.B., University of California, Berkeley; M.A., University of California, Irvine; J.D.,
University of Chicago.
1. FED. R. Civ. P 1 (1966), 2, 8(e)(2) (1966), 18 (1966), 19 (1966), & 20 (1966).
2. F JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, CIVII PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 19 (2d ed. 1977).
3. Id. § 9.18, at 435-38.
4. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (Florida and Delaware courts reached
opposite conclusions concerning the validity of an inter vivos trust).
5. Rules governing necessary and indispensable parties are m FED. R. Civ. P 19 (1966).
6. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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tive holding. Owen Construction and Erection Co. v. Kroger'
limited the ancillary jurisdiction of federal courts, and a prior case,
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.,9 limited pendent jurisdiction. An
explanation for these restrictive holdings is that the Burger Court
is exalting states' rights by limiting the power of one state to adjudicate the rights of parties who live or do business in other states and
by limiting the power of federal courts to adjudicate state controver10
sies.
These cases are recent examples of how the Supreme Court has
hindered the goal of providing a unitary forum. This Article will
discuss these cases in relation to that goal. It concludes that, in light
of the Court's rulings, Congress should provide a federal forum for
the adjudication of multi-state controversies.
THE RESTRICTION OF STATE COURT JURISDICTION

JurisdictionalTheory up to Shaffer v. Heitner
The focal point of the contemporary limits of state court jurisdiction is Shaffer v. Heitner j1 That case rejected prior jurisdictional
theory and recast it in a contemporary mold. In order to understand
the impact of Shaffer, a brief review of jurisdictional concepts, starting with Pennoyer v. Neff,12 isnecessary
A basic premise of Pennoyer was that the states are independent
3
sovereigns, which interact as foreign nations do with each other.'
The concept of independent state sovereignty was Pennoyer'sinitial
premise rather than its inductive conclusion. The fact that the national government had such sovereign powers as making war and
peace, building an interstate navigational and railway system, and
prohibiting the states from denying equal protection or due process
8. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
9. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
10. See notes 82-88 infra & accompanying text.
11. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
12. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Supreme Court may have overruled Pennoyer in Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977). This Article, however, argues that to view Shaffer as
overruling Pennoyer is too simplistic. See text following note 88 infra.
13. 95 U.S. at 722. To Justice Field, who wrote the opinion, the principles of jurisdiction
were "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory.
The other principle
follows from the one mentioned;
that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory." Id.
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of law did not influence the opinion." Justice Field, who wrote the
opinion, thought it impossible that the states could be other than
independent adjudicatory bodies. They could not be parts of a coordinated federal whole.
Pennoyer's system was limited by the state's territory* a court
could adjudicate interests only if persons or property were within its
borders. 15 This necessarily restricted the power of a state to adjudicate all aspects of a controversy If two defendants' persons or property could not be found within one state, no one state could grant a
judgment against both of them.
The Pennoyersystem became inadequate in a complex, industrial
society In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington," the issue was
whether a state could adjudicate a corporation's liability for failure
to contribute to its unemployment compensation program. The
Court ruled that the defendant did not need to be physically present
within the state for in personam jurisdiction to exist if it had
"minimum contacts" with the forum state. 17 The minimum contacts test avoided many conceptual difficulties, such as deciding the
location of the corporation 8 and instead, it focused on activities and
relations of the defendant with the forum. 9 By requiring less than
actual presence, the case expanded the scope of state court jurisdiction.
The InternationalShoe standard, however, was interpreted in
two different ways. Under one interpretation, the courts looked at
each defendant's physical or business connections with the state.
Under the other, a defendant's individual contacts were not regarded as determinative. Rather, courts weighed a complex set of
14. See Hazard, A GeneralTheory of State-CourtJurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 264.
15. See Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner:An End to Ambivalence in JurisdictionTheory?, 26 U.
KAN.L. Rav. 61, 61-63 (1977).
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. Id. at 316.
18. Id. at 316-17. The Court recognized the fictional nature of the corporate personality,
and it stated:
To say that the corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy due process
requirements
is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present"
or "presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's
agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process.

Id.
19. See id. at 319-20.
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factors: the regulatory concerns of the state, the convenience of the
parties, the location of witnesses, the law to be applied, and possible
2
alternative jurisdictions.
Under the first interpretation, a state often may not have jurisdiction over a defendant because of that defendant's lack of contacts
with the state. In Hanson v. Denckla,21 for example, the Supreme
Court held that the Delaware trustee never did enough in Florida
to submit itself to Florida's jurisdiction. Therefore, Florida lacked
22
in personam jurisdiction over the trustee.
Under the second view, the criteria may be manipulated in order
to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. A classic example of the application of the second view is Atkinson v. Superior
Court.2 In that case, Chief Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court
of California confronted the same problem as in Hanson: was it
possible to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee who was
indispensable to an adjudication of the lawsuit? The case involved
a suit by California employees who challenged the validity of an
employees' benefit fund. The employees worked in California, and
a portion of their paychecks was turned over to the trustee of the
fund, who was located in New York. The trustee, an indispensable
party, was essential to the adjudication of the lawsuit. It was important to be able to join the New York trustee and the California
employers in one lawsuit.2 4 Justice Traynor found jurisdiction over
the trustee by weighing a variety of factors: the relationship of the
subject matter of the lawsuit with the state; the California location
of the employees and their employers; the relative convenience of
the parties; the interest of California in adjudicating the lawsuit;
and the importance of joining the trustee.2
Justice Traynor's approach emphasized jurisdictional criteria
that are similar to those involved in determining choice-of-law issues. Because of this similarity, these criteria have been called
"choice-of-law" considerations.28 Other names include "center-of20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Casad, supra note 15, at 64-65.
357 U.S. 235 (1958). See notes 36-41 infra & accompanying text.
357 U.S. at 254.
49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960, appeal dismissed, 357 U.S. 569 (1957).
Id. at
, 316 P.2d at 961-62.
Id. at.,
316 P.2d at 966.
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 254 (1957).
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gravity" ' 7 and "interstate venue." 2s When denoted as the center-ofgravity test, the appropriate question was: Where is the center-ofgravity of the transaction being litigated? In Atkinson, the presence
of the employees, the employers, and the work made the center-ofgravity California. The interstate venue concept, unlike Pennoyer,
contemplated the states as part of a coordinated whole, in which the
system composed of all the state courts could adjudicate controversies governed by state law It asked the question: Where is the best
state in which to adjudicate the controversy'
Under the interstate venue theory, a state may reach an out-ofstate defendant if he is involved in a transaction appropriate for
adjudication within that state. In Atkinson, the transactions that
formed the basis of the lawsuit-the employment in California and
the formation of the benefit trust-created a relationship between
the controversy and California, which in turn gave the state jurisdiction over the trustee.
Conceptually, the interstate venue theory assumed no difference
between state and federal-jurisdictional models. In Atkinson, Justice Traynor reasoned that if federal courts may have nationwide
service of process, state courts may also.29 Justice Traynor's failure
to perceive a conceptual difference between state and federal jurisdiction was an implicit rejection of Pennoyer's central premise of
state independent sovereignty. Thus, he viewed the state courts as
subordinate units in a federal system of jurisdiction."
27. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978).

28. F JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, supra note 2, § 12.30, at 661-63. Articles discussing this
jurisdictional theory include Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdictionto Interstate Venue, 50
OR. L. Rav. 103 (1971); Hazard, supra note 14; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?,
37 Tax. L. Rav. 657 (1959); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 RocKy

MTN. L. Rav. 285 (1958); Enrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Convenience, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).

29. 49 Cal. 2d at 338, 316 P.2d at 966. Justice Traynor stated:
It is doubtful whether today the United States Supreme Court would deny to a
state court the interstate interpleader jurisdiction that federal courts may exercise. A remedy that a federal court may provide without violating due process
of law does not become unfair and unjust because it is sought in a state court
instead.
Id.
30. James and Hazard described the concept:

Instead of thinking of the states as independent sovereigns, between which
peaceful relations must be maintained through the Due Process Clause, the
state court systems taken as a whole can be conceived as the primary mechanism for adjudicating cases domestic to the country as a whole, other than those
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The Supreme Court, in the late fifties, appeared to waver between
the restrictive view of minimum contacts and the more expansive
interstate venue theory 31 In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance
Co.,32 the Court held that California, the residence of an insurance
beneficiary, could obtain jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company that had dealt by mail with the California insured.3 3 The Court
found the existence of a contract between the parties sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process.3 4 The Court also was influenced
by the location of witnesses in California and the inconvenience, if
not the impossibility, of litigating the matter in Texas.3 In McGee,
the Court looked at the relationship between the controversy and
the state, not the defendant and the state. In effect, it applied the
interstate venue test.
In Hanson v. Denckla,36 decided in the same term as McGee, the
Court held that Florida did not have jurisdiction over a Delaware
trustee.3 7Hanson involved a dispute over an estate by three sisters,
two of whom took under their mother's will and contended that a
trust executed by their mother in favor of a third sister's children
was invalid." The question was whether Florida had jurisdiction
over the Delaware trustee of that trust. The Court ruled that Florida
could not obtain in personam jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee
and, because the trustee was an indispensable party, the Florida
court could not adjudicate the controversy 31 In Hanson, the question was not the most convenient forum, the center-of-gravity' of the
dispute, or the relationship of the forum to the controversy It was,
rather, the relationship of the forum to the particular defendant, the
trustee. Thus, the Court relied on a more restrictive minimum conbased on federal law. As such, they have not only the power but the duty to
extend their process, in the form of notice, to all parties who should or might
be joined under modern concepts of party joinder.
F JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, supra note 2, § 12.30, at 661-62.
31. See Casad, supra note 15, at 66.
32. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
33. Id. at 221, 223.
34. Id. at 223.
35. Id.
36. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
37. Id. at 254.
38. Id. at 238-39.
39. Id. at 254-55.
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tacts rationale rather than the expansive interstate venue approach."
Hanson's restrictive approach was looked upon with disfavor, if
not incredulity, by the proponents of interstate venue.4 Certainly
under an Atkinson rationale, Florida should have had jurisdiction:
the testatrix died in Florida, her will was admitted to probate m
Florida, and the executrix and the main beneficiaries under the will
and trust were served personally with process there.
Thus, on the eve of the Court's latest major jurisdictional pronouncement, Shaffer v. Heitner,4 2 two competing jurisdictional
schemes existed: the Pennoyer system4 3 and the InternationalShoe
system. 4 The latter interpretation, in turn, was subject to the two
approaches of Hanson and Atkinson. Hanson adopted a onedimensional test-the particular defendant's relationship to the
forum. In contrast, Atkinson weighed a variety of factors involving
fairness and convenience to all the parties.4 5
The Emerging JurisdictionalTheory
Shaffer v. Heitner
Shaffer v. Heitner" has been hailed as comparable to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins4 7 in breaking new ground and rejecting the outmoded, century-old jurisdictional scheme of Pennoyer v. Neff The
outcome in Shaffer, however, demonstrates that the Court has
restricted the scope of a state court's power to obtain jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendants. In light of the prior jurisdictional systems,48 Shaffer represents a retreat, not an advance, to a more re40. The Court stated that Florida "does not acquire that jurisdiction by being the 'center
of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is
personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this case by considering the acts of
the trustee." Id. at 254.
41. Professor Hazard's comment is typical: "In a 5 to 4 decision, Mr. Chief Justice Warren
reached the fair result, in favor of the executrix daughter, but by a line of analysis that in all
charity and after mature reflection is impossible to follow, no less to relate." Hazard, supra
note 14, at 244.
42. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
43. See notes 13-15 supra and notes 55-58, 69-71 mnfra & accompanying text.
44. See notes 16-19 supra & accompanying text.
45. See notes 20-41 supra & accompanying text. See also Casad, supra note 15, at 64-65.
46. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal district court, in
diversity cases, must apply state law, not concepts of general law. Id. at 78-80.
48. These jurisdictional systems include the interstate venue theory of in personam juris-
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strictive view of state court powers.
The facts of Shaffer have been recounted in innumerable law
reviews.49 Here, only those facts immediately relevant to our topic
will be mentioned. Shaffer involved a stockholder's derivative action. Heitner, the owner of one share of stock in Greyhound, filed
his action in Delaware's Court of Chancery against Greyhound, a
Delaware corporation, its subsidiary Greyhound Lines, a California
corporation, and twenty-eight past and present directors and officers of the corporation. Both corporations had their principal place
of business in Phoenix, Arizona. Plaintiff Heitner alleged that the
officers and directors had violated their duties to Greyhound by
causing it to engage in wrongful actions, which resulted in an antitrust judgment of $13,149,000 and criminal contempt fines of

$500,000.1"
diction, see notes 23-35 supra & accompanying text, and quasi in rem jurisdiction. See notes
55-58, 69-71 infra & accompanying text.
49. A sampling of such articles follows: Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner"An End to Ambivalence
in JurisdictionTheory?, 26 U. KAN.L. RaV. 61 (1977); Fischer, "Minimum Contacts" Shaffer's Unified JurisdictionalTest, 12 VAL. U.L. Rav. 25 (1977); Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner"The
Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction,26 EMORY L.J. 739 (1977);
Lacy, PersonalJurisdictionand Service of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 ORE. L. REV.
505 (1978); Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction,66 Ky.
L.J. 1 (1977); Olsen, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Survey of Its Effects on Washington Jurisdiction,
13 GONZ. L. REv. 72 (1977); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner" The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 33 (1978); Young, The Supreme Court Report, 63 A.B.A.J. 1608, 1612 (1977); Zammit,
Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1978); The Supreme Court,
1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 152 (1977); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner"New Constitutional
Questions Concerning Seider v. Roth, 6 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 393 (1978); Note, Civil Procedure-A
Single Theory of State Court Jurisdiction:"Minimum Contacts," 52 TUL. L. REV. 171 (1977);
Note, Shaffer v. Heitner"A New Attitude Toward State Court Jurisdiction,13 TULSA L.J. 82
(1977); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner-The Demise of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction?,32 U. MIAMi L.
REv. 680 (1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner's Effect on Pre-JudgmentAttachment, Jurisdiction Based on Property, and New York's Seider Doctrine: Have We Finally Given Up the
Ghost of the Res?, 27 BUFFALO L. REv. 323 (1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Single Test
for State Court Jurisdiction,55 DEN. L.J. 365 (1978); Note, Quasi in Rem on the Heels of
Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe Fits
, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 459 (1977); Note,
The Expanded Scope of the Sufficient Minimum Contacts Standard: Shaffer v. Heitner,
63 IOWA L. REv. 504 (1977); Note, Constitutionality of the Seider PracticeAfter Shaffer v.
Heitner, 49 U. CoLO. L. REv. 321 (1978); Note, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice Extended: Shaffer v. Heitner, 1977 UTAH L. Rav. 361; Note, The Reasonableness Standard in State-CourtJurisdiction:Shaffer v. Heitnerand the Uniform Minimum
Contacts Theory, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 51 (1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme
Court Establishes a Uniform Approach to State Court Jurisdiction,35 WASH. & LEa L. Rv.
131 (1978); 27 DRAKE L. Rav. 553 (1978).
50. 433 U.S. at 189-90. The private antitrust action was recently vacated and remanded
by the Court. Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322 (1978). The private
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The lawsuit, in several respects, was typical of modem complex
litigation, involving several causes of action and many defendants.
The controversy itself was national in scope: Greyhound did business nationally, its headquarters was in Arizona, and the fines were
levied in Illinois. 5'
In order to obtain jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants,
plaintiff, pursuant to a Delaware statute, obtained an order of sequestration and seized the defendants' shares of stock, options, and
warrants issued by the Greyhound Corporation.,' Under Delaware
law, the situs of such intangible property was deemed to be in Delaware.13 Securities of Delaware corporations could be seized by placing a "stop transfer" order or its equivalent on the books of such
corporations. 4 This was an exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction; 5
however, Delaware lacked limited appearance, which would have
allowed the defendants to appear in defense but be liable only up
to the value of the property seized." Thus, the defendants had a
choice of appearing and subjecting themselves to an in personam
judgment or defaulting and forfeiting the seized property Since the
value of the seized property was so high, the latter option was not
viable. Consequently, the defendants were forced to file a special
appearance for the purpose of moving to quash service of process
and to vacate the sequestration order.
The Supreme Court held Delaware's exercise of quasi m rem juris74,824, 74,850
action in the lower courts is reported in 1973-2 TRADs REG. REP. (CCH)
(D. Ore. 1973), affd, 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.), vacated, 437 U.S. 322 (1977); the governmental
action against Greyhound is reported in United States v. Greyhound Corp., 308 F Supp. 1033
(N.D. Ill. 1970), 363 F Supp. 525 (N.D. li. 1973), and 370 F Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1974), which
were affirmed in 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974).
51. 433 U.S. at 189, 189 n.1, 190, 190 n.S.

52. Id. at 190, 190-91 n.4. The Delaware statute was DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (Michie 1975).
53. 433 U.S. at 192, 192 n.9. The Delaware statute was DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 169 (Michie
1975).

54. 433 U.S. at 192.
55. Quasi in rem jurisdiction involves the seizure of defendant's property, which is located
within the state. The purpose is to obtain jurisdiction indirectly over the defendant, and
normally he is liable up to the value of the property seized. Id. at 199, 199 n.17. The classic
example of quasi in rem jurisdiction by attachment of an intangible is Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1905), overruled, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). On the location of intangibles, see Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 102 (1978). Professor Lowenfeld concludes that there is no "unified field
theory" for judicially locating intangibles such as stock. Id. at 122.
56. 433 U.S. at 195 n.12.
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diction to be unconstitutional.17 It rejected the Pennoyer division of
jurisdiction between in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam, and it
recognized that the exercise of power over property is really the
exercise of power over an individual's interests in that property
Thus, the minimum contacts rationale of InternationalShoe, which
allowed courts to assert jurisdiction over a person's interests, was
applicable. 8
Had the Court proceeded no further and remanded the case, the
United States would have been well on its way to adopting the
interstate venue theory of jurisdiction. The Court, however, also
decided whether Delaware constitutionally could exercise jurisdiction over the defendants on a minimum contacts rationale." It rejected the argument that choice-of-law and most convenient forum
considerations should control the jurisdictional choice. Such factors
were important only to the determination of which state's law
should apply to the case. 0 Finally, finding no relationship between
the defendants and the state of Delaware, the Court held that Delaware lacked jurisdiction." The Court thus adopted a restrictive defi57. Id. at 212.
58. Id. at 207. The Court notes that the presence of property within the state may provide
sufficient minimum contacts with the defendant if the litigation directly concerns the property. Id. at 207-08. Thus, traditional in rem actions appear to be unaffected by the holding.
Id. at 208.
59. Id. at 213-17.
60. The Court stated:
The interest appellee has identified may support the application of Delaware
law to resolve any controversy over appellants' actions in their capacities as
officers and directors. But we have rejected the argument that if a State's law
can properly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have jurisdiction over
the parties to that dispute.
"[The State] does not acquire
jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue
is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this case by considering the acts of the [appellants]."
Id. at 215 quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
61. Id. at 216. Justices Powell, Stevens, and Brennan filed separate opinions. Justice
Stevens's opinion was based on the principle that notice should be given to a possible defendant that he may be subject to a court's jurisdiction. Because one who purchases stock in
a Delaware corporation would not expect to be under Delaware jurisdiction, to subject him
to it is unfair. Id. at 217-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan agreed that the InternationalShoe minimum contacts test should apply
to quasi in rem cases; however, he believed that the Court proceeded improperly to decide
whether Delaware actually had jurisdiction over the defendants. He noted that the parties
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nition of minimum contacts that concentrated on the relationship
between the forum and the defendant.
Kulko v. Superior Court
Shaffer was followed one year later by the Court in Kulko v.
Superior Court.12 Kulko involved a multi-state controversy between
two divorced spouses. Plaintiff had separated from the defendant
and left their New York home to move to California. After a settlement agreement was executed in New York, plaintiff flew to Haiti
and obtained a divorce decree that incorporated the settlement
agreement. The settlement agreement provided that the children of
the marriage were to remain with the father during the school year
and with the mother during vacations and that the husband was to
pay $3,000 in child support. The daughter, with her father's consent,
joined her mother in California, and then the son, without consent,
moved to California. The wife then sued for full custody of the
children and an increase of the child support obligations. Mr. Kulko
3
claimed that California lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit.

The Court held that there was no personal jurisdiction. " It again
rejected the interstate venue test, 65 and, instead, it based its holding

on the defendant's lack of contacts with California.66 The Court
found that defendant had not purposefully availed himself of the
had no opportunity to develop through discovery the factual basis that could have supported
minimum contacts jurisdiction. Id. at 219-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part).
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's treatment of choice-of-law considerations;
he objected to the Court's rigid compartmentalization of choice-of-law and jurisdiction. Id.
at 222-28. Specifically, he maintained that Delaware had jurisdiction over the case: "[AJ
state forum has jurisdiction to adjudicate a stockholder derivative action centering on the
conduct and policies of the directors and officers of a corporation chartered by that State."
Id. at 222. He adopted a flexible center-of-gravity, or interstate venue, approach.
62. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The decision of the Supreme Court of California is discussed in
Fischer, State Interests, Minimum Contacts, and In Personam Jurisdiction Under Code of
Civil Procedure Section 410.10, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 387 (1978).
63. 436 U.S. at 86-88.
64. Id. at 101.
65. See id. at 95-96, 98-101.
66. Id. at 96-98. The Court noted that California's interest in ensuring support for resident
children was served by the revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968.
Id. at 98. Because the plaintiff could use that Act to enforce her rights without leaving
California, she was not severely disadvantaged by the Court's decision. Id. at 98-100. The
presence of this alternative mode of litigation probably helped to defeat jurisdiction. However, the presence of the Act did not appear to be necessary to the holding.
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benefits and privileges of conducting activities within California.
His activities had created no effect in California. The facts that his
children were in California and that he had sent one of them there
were not enough to establish jurisdiction. 7
In Kulko, the Court reiterated its stand against an expansive view
of state court jurisdiction." It seemingly increased the amount or
the quality of contacts necessary to establish jurisdiction and again
rejected the complex, multi-factored center-of-gravity, or interstate
venue, test.
The Effect of Shaffer and Kulko
The Supreme Court's rulings have limited the scope of a state's
jurisdiction in three ways: by applying the minimum contacts test
to quasi in rem jurisdiction; by requiring more than a minimum
amount of minimum contacts; and by rejecting the interstate venue
jurisdictional concept. It has hindered severely a plaintiff's ability
to reach out-of-state defendants.
In general, quasi in rem jurisdiction gave plaintiffs a way to reach
out-of-state defendants. Of course, the presence of defendant's
property within a state might have been purely accidental, but it
did give a means to obtain jurisdiction over him.
By rejecting quasi in rem as a basis for jurisdiction, Shaffer abolished a jurisdictional device that provided a single forum for the
trial of complex litigation. 9 Prior to that case, a Delaware court
67. Id. at 98.
68. The Court stated: "We therefore believe that the state courts in the instant case failed
to heed our admonition that 'the flexible standard of International Shoe' does not 'heraltdl
the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.'" Id. at
101, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
69. The quasi in rem procedure still exists. To utilize this procedure, however, the minimum contacts test must be satisfied. A direct relationship between the defendant's property
and the litigation may be sufficient to meet this test. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
207-08 (1977).
Some quasi in rem actions remain alive in lower courts. In Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441
F Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court upheld jurisdiction based on the attachment of
defendant's bank account and construed Shaffer as requiring only a voluntary placing of
property within the jurisdiction. Id. at 1278-79. The Seider v. Roth attachment of insurance policies of an out-of-state tortfeasor was reaffirmed in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 639 (1978). Minnesota's application of
245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), was vacated in light of
Minn. -,
Seider, Savehuk v. Rush, Shaffer, Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), and reaffirmed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, __
Minn. -,
272 N.W.2d 888 (1978), prob. jurts. noted, 99 S. Ct. 1211 (1979).
See Williams, The Validity of Assuming Jurisdiction by the Attachment of Automobile
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could, through the quasi in rem procedure of seizing the defendants'
shares in a Delaware corporation, obtain jurisdiction over all or most
of the directors and officers of the corporation. 0 After Shaffer, Delaware courts could not provide a forum to litigate the liability of all
the corporate officers and directors at one time. In fact, probably no
forum could have exercised jurisdiction over each of the twenty71
eight defendants.
The Court has restricted state jurisdiction by requiring a high
level of activities to support a finding of minimum contacts. In
answering the question of what minimum contacts means, one must
know the number and quality of activities and relations within a
state that are required to meet the test. If any contact that a defendant has with the forum may meet the test, then jurisdiction over
him can be obtained easily In McGee v. InternatinalLife Insurance Co.,"2 for example, the solicitation of one life insurance policyholder in California was enough to support jurisdiction over the
Texas insurer.
Justice Marshall in Shaffer, however, stated that the defendants
had no relationship with the forum even though they controlled a
Delaware corporation and owned property that was under the regulation and protection of Delaware law 73 Certainly, the defendants
purposefully were seeking the protection of Delaware law In Kulko,
defendant's children were in California, and he had sent one of them
there. Notwithstanding these facts, the Court found virtually no
connection between the defendant and the forum.7 4 A "de minimus"
Liability Insurance Obligations: The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner Upon Seider v.Roth, 9
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 241 (1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: New Constitutional Questions Concernmng Seider v. Roth, 6 HOFSTRA L. RaV. 393 (1978).
provide a solution, at least prior to Shaffer, to a problem
70. "Delaware's scheme did
inherent in many shareholder derivative suits-obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident directors and the corporation, both of which are generally considered necessary party defendants
in derivative actions." The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 153-54 n.9 (1977).
71. Since Shaffer, Delaware has passed a consent statute by which nonresident directors
are amenable to service of process by a Delaware court. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 3114 (Michie
Supp. 1978). This statute is discussed in Stargatt, The New DelawareDirector-Consent-ToService Statute, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 217 (1978).

72. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
73. 433 U.S. at 216.
74. 436 U.S. at 97. In October of 1978, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that Missouri
could exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident doctor who had given advice to a Missouri
doctor by telephone without charge. The advice was claimed to have harmed the plaintiff,
who sued the out-of-state doctor for malpractice. Sperandio v. Clymer, Mo. , 568
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minimum contacts standard would have supported the jurisdiction
of the Delaware and California courts. The Court's requirement of
significant rather than de minimus minimum contacts in Kulko and
Shaffer is reminiscent of Hanson v. Denckla.75 The Court clearly
disapproved of an expansive reading of the contacts test that would
create jurisdiction over any defendant.
Shaffer not only abolished quasi in rem jurisdiction and required
a significant amount of contacts, but it also chose the approach of
Hanson over that of McGee and Atkinson. Shaffer looked only to the
relationship between the defendants and the forum, and it did not
weigh the convenience of the parties or the difficulty of getting them
into one court. It squarely rejected the argument that Delaware's
interest in regulating her corporations or applying Delaware law
should satisfy the minimum contacts test. Like Shaffer, Kulko also
rejected the center-of-gravity, or interstate venue, theory 7
This rejection of choice-of-law factors in determining jurisdiction
severely limits the ability of a court to adjudicate all the interests
of all possible defendants. Under the interstate venue test, the best
court should adjudicate all the lawsuits that arise out of one transaction. In multi-state litigation, a court may declare itself the
center-of-gravity and order joinder of a defendant. In Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,77 for example, the plaintiff was able
to sue both the Ohio manufacturer of the boiler that had injured
him and the California physicians and hospital that had negligently
treated those injuries, even though the Ohio manufacturer had
very little contact with the forum. Had the Shaffer test been applicable to the parties in Buckeye Boiler, the plaintiff possibly could
S.W.2d 935 (1978). The case was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court to be reconsidered in light of Kulko. Pemberton v. Sperandio, 99 S. Ct. 69 (1978).
75. See notes 21-22 supra & accompanying text. See also Casad, supra note 15, at 74;
Note, Shaffer v. Heitner's Effect on Pre-JudgmentAttachment, JurisdictionBased on
Property and New York's Seider Doctrine:Have We Finally Given Up the Ghost of the Res?,
27 BUFFALO L. REV. 323, 344 (1978).
76. "But while the presence of the children and one parent in California arguably might
favor application of California law in a lawsuit in New York, the fact that California may be
the 'center-of-gravity' for choice-of-law purposes does not mean that California has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant." 436 U.S. at 98.
77. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). Although Buckeye Boiler ostensibly was decided under Hanson, it fits conceptually into the interstate venue line of cases. The
Supreme Court will consider jurisdictional questions in the products liability area in the 197980 term. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).
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not have sued all defendants in one forum. Under the Shaffer test,
as in Hanson, a necessary, or even an indispensable party may not
have the required minimum contacts with the forum.
Many commentators on Shaffer have ignored or minimized its
implications. Professor Leathers, for example, argued that Shaffer's
denial of any relationship between choice-of-law and

jurisdiction

should not be taken at face value.78 He considered the Court's statements concerning the relationship of choice-of-law to jurisdiction to
be dicta." Professor Leathers concluded by urging a reevaluation by
the Supreme Court of the due process controls over state judicial
and legislature power. Until that time, he recommended ignoring
Shaffer's and Hanson's rejection of choice-of-law considerations in
deciding jurisdiction."0 Instead of limiting Shaffer's scope, the Court
in Kulko reaffirmed the division between choice-of-law and jurisdiction: the fact that California law may have governed Mr. Kulko's
support.obligations did not create judicial jurisdiction in California.
Shaffer's determination that choice-of-law factors are not jurisdictional considerations was gratuitous. As Justice Brennan recognized, the only issue that was before the Court was the constitutionality of Delaware's quasi in rem statute.81 The Court could have
remanded the case to determine whether Delaware had minimum
contacts with the defendants. The fact that' it did not emphasizes
the importance of the holding. It must contain a view of jurisdiction
that the Court wanted to communicate: first, that the jurisdictional
question is the relation between the forum and the defendant, not
that between the forum and the controversy; and second, that the
states are independent entities, not coordinate parts of a federal
whole. Due to these factors, a state may be unable to join all necessary defendants to a lawsuit.
78. If taken literally, this would mean that it is possible for a state to have sufficient contact to satisfy due process controls for choice of law purposes, yet
lack sufficient contact to satisfy due process control over judicial jurisdiction.
However, it is not necessary to take the language in either Shaffer or Hanson
literally.
Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction,66 Ky. L.J. 1, 36
(1977).
79. He stated that they "can be regarded as unfortunately included.
If, as has been
contended, the state of Delaware did indeed have sufficient contact to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant directors, then there would be no divergence between the
choice of law limitations and the jurisdictional limitations." Id. at 36-37.
80. Id. at 37.
81. 433 U.S. at 220-22 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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Paradoxically, the Court may be protecting state sovereignty
Even though Shaffer has been said to diminish state sovereignty, in
effect, it treats the states as separate sovereigns, which may ignore
the federal whole. Under the interstate venue concept, if one state
has the power to adjudicate the rights of defendants wherever they
may be, the sovereignty of other states is diminished. Professor
Kurland recognized this in 1958 when he argued that Hanson may
be seen as a limitation of federalism. 82 Like Hanson, the- effect of
Shaffer and Kulko is to reinforce state sovereignty
This reading of Shaffer and Kulko is consistent with the Burger
Court's bolstering of states' rights. This trend has been noted in
several articles. The present Court has restricted the power of Congress to pass minimum wage legislation covering state employees in
National League of Cities v. Usery," limiting the power of federal
courts to enjoin state courts in Younger v. Harris85 and its progeny,
created a higher burden to prove a violation of civil rights by state
officials in Rizzo v. Goode,8" and read in an intent requirement in
fourteenth amendment equal protection causes of action against
state officials for racial discrimination in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.87 and Dayton
5 As a reaffirmation of state
Board of Education v. Brinkman."
independence, Shaffer and Kulko are entrenched securely in this trend
of cases, which establishes the states' rights ideology of the Burger
82. The result is another major step-in this instance, perhaps a desirable
one-toward the limitation of the federal principle. For state lines may be as
easily erased by the enhancement of state power as by the expansion of national
authority. To the extent that one state's judicial control over a legal controversy
is increased, the control of all other states over that controversy is diminished.
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdictionof
State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 569 (1958).
83. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976);
Tribe, UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV 1065 (1977); Developments in the
Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAav. L. REV. 1133 (1977); Note, Rizzo v. Goode: The
Burger Court's ContinuingAssault on Federal Jurisdiction,30 RUTGERS L. REv. 103 (1976);
15 DuQ. L. REv. 49 (1976); 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 467 (1977).
84. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
85. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
86. 423 U.S.362 (1975).
87. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
88. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
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Court. Thus, Shaffer is not a radical overruling of Pennoyer
Shaffer, in fact, is based on the first premise of Pennoyer: the individual state is an independent sovereign. Kulko firmly fixes the
limits of that sovereignty
The holdings of Shaffer and Kulko already have had an effect.
Although many courts, in applying the Shaffer standard, have
found the requisite minimum contacts," several other courts have
applied it to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. One case, Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.," used Shaffer
to reject jurisdiction based on a Mississippi "implied consent" statute. 2 By statute, the defendant, which had registered to do business
in Mississippi, was deemed to have consented to service of process
and suit within the state. The court ruled that the exercise of jurisdiction under this statute must satisfy the minimum contacts test.
It held that sufficient minimum contacts were not present since the
plaintiff, a Kansas resident, had received injury in Kansas and the
defendant's manufacturing activities were located in another
state. 3
THE RESTRICTION OF FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
As we have seen, Shaffer and Kulko hinder the complete resolution of many controversies at the state level. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, federal statutes, and Supreme Court decisions have
89. E.g., Marketing Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 445 F Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y.
Colo. , 572 P.2d 476 (1977); Wier v.
1978); At Home Magazine v. District Court, Fairfield Galleries, Inc., 377 A.2d 28 (Del. Ch. 1977); Cox v. Long, 143 Ga. App. 182, 237
S.E.2d 672 (1977); Boyer v. Boyer, 57 Il1.App. 3d 555, 373 N.E.2d 441, modified on appeal,
-

Ill. App. 3d

-_,

383 N.E.2d 223 (1978); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Gitchoff, 68

Ill. 2d 38, 369 N.E.2d 52 (1977); Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 Ill. App. 2d 296, 367
N.E.2d 118 (1977). See note 69 supra & accompanying text.
90. E.g., Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978); Nelepovitz
v. Boatwright, 442 F Supp. 1336 (D.S.C. 1977); Pavlo v. James, 437 F Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
91. 448 F Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978). This suit originally was filed in Mississippi by the
Kansas plaintiff, who had been injured m Kansas. Id. at 1081. Had plaintiff sued in Kansas,
the Kansas statute of limitations would have barred the suit. Id. Plaintiff served defendant's
agent in Mississippi pursuant to a statute "which provide[d] for such service upon any
corporation 'found doing business' in Mississippi, 'whether the cause of action accrued in this
state or not.' "Id. The case thereafter was transferred to the United States District Court in
Kansas. Id. at 1081-82. Defendant then claimed that the Mississippi court lacked personal
jurisdiction. Id. at 1082, 1085.
92. Id. at 1090-91.
93. Id.
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limited the scope of federal court jurisdiction.
At present, the scope of federal jurisdiction is limited by the restrictions on federal service of process in rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, by the requirements of complete diversity, 4 and
by the amount in controversy rule. 5 Rules 4(e) and (f) limit the
federal courts' power to serve process. 6 Each court may serve defendants within the territorial limits of the state in which it sits, " or it
may reach nonresident defendants if the jurisdictional statutes of
such state so authorize. Third-party defendants may be served
within 100 miles of the court.9 Some federal statutes, such as interpleader, provide for nationwide service of process in some instances,
but not in all. 1 0 Thus, although federal courts theoretically have
nationwide jurisdiction, their powers are limited practically by the
federal rules.
In America Eutetic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys
Corp.,oi for example, a federal court in New York was unable to
obtain jurisdiction over a defendant corporation and defendant
employees in an unfair competition suit that alleged an illegal hiring
away of the employees by the defendant corporation. The scope of
the federal court's service of process was limited to that of courts of
the state in which the district court was located, which was New
York. That state's statute provided for jurisdiction only if the harm
occurred in New York. Since the defendant corporation's unfair
competition had occurred not in New York, but in Kentucky, the
0 2
court could not obtain jurisdiction over the corporate defendants.
94. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West
Supp. 1979).
95. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West Supp. 1979). The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation is an attempt to allow consolidation of federal suits into one lawsuit. This consolidation device, however, only merges the pretrial motion and discovery procedures. It is unable,
without the consent of the parties, to consolidate the trials themselves. Id. § 1407 (1976 &
Supp. 1979). See, e.g., In re Aviation Prod. Liab. Litigation, 347 F Supp. 1401 (J.P.M.D.L.
1972).
96. FED. R. Civ. P 4(e) & (f) (1966).
97. Id. 4(f).
98. Id. 4(e).
99. Id. 4(f).
100. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (West 1976). See Georgia Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 321
F Supp. 307, 309 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
101. 439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971).
102. Id. at 432-35.
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The Supreme Court's Limitations on Federal Court Jurisdiction
Federal courts have used the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction to obtain jurisdiction over parties and causes of action
tangential to the lawsuit. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,03 for example, held that if a federal court has jurisdiction over a federal
question claim, then the court has judicial power, called pendent
jurisdiction, to consider a non-federal claim where both claims are
derived from "a common nucleus of operative fact."' 01 Ancillary
jurisdiction gives federal courts the power to hear cases involving
multi-party practice, such as compulsory counterclaims and impleader.0 5
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Zahn v. InternationalPaper
Co. ' 8 and Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger,I have
limited these powers of federal courts. In both cases, the Court, as
it did in Shaffer, rejected the policy arguments for unitary adjudication.
Zahn was brought as a class action on behalf of some 200 lakefront
property owners against a paper mill that was polluting their lake.
Some of the property owners could claim the $10,000 amount in
controversy while others could not."0 ' Plaintiffs argued that either
they should be able to aggregate their claims to meet the $10,000
requirement or the ancillary jurisdiction of the court should extend
over those claims that were under $10,000. The Court rejected these
arguments and ruled that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action must satify the jurisdictional amount [or] be dismissed from
109
the case
Justice Brennan dissented"0 noting that the use of ancillary jurisdiction avoids fragmented and redundant litigation of common issues."' He noted the intolerable expense of "extensive use of expert
testimony on difficult scientific issues" for the 240 claimants." 2 He
103. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
104. Id. at 725.

105. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 n.18 (1978).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

414 U.S. 291 (1973).
437 U.S. 365 (1978).
414 U.S. at 292-93. See Currie, Pendent Parties,45 U. CHi. L. REv. 753 (1978).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 305-12.
Id. at 307.
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emphasized the burden, caused by the Court's decision, of3 having
to maintain separate lawsuits in federal and state courts."
Although Zahn might have been brought in a state court, in which
the amount in controversy requirement does not apply, several
states have not adopted simple class action procedures similar to
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 4 Therefore, the
result in Zahn encourages fragmented litigation.
The Court in Owen similarly refused to recognize arguments of
convenience or judicial economy In Owen, plaintiff filed a wrongful
death action in federal court seeking damages for her husband's
electrocution. At the time of his death, her husband was walking
next to a steel crane. The boom of the crane came close to an electric
power line, and he was electrocuted. She sued the Omaha Public
Power District (OPPD), basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The widow was a citizen of Iowa and OPPD was a Nebraska
corporation. OPPD impleaded the owner and operator of the crane,
Owen Equipment and Erection Company, pursuant to rule 14(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff then filed an
amended complaint naming Owen as an additional defendant. Subsequently, OPPD's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff
was granted." 5
On the third day of trial, the court became aware that Owen's
principal place of business was in Iowa, not Nebraska, and therefore
there was a lack of diversity The district court refused to dismiss
the complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals held that no independent basis of federal jurisdiction supporting the widow's state tort action against Owen was needed."'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirement of
113. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan consistently votes to uphold
jurisdiction. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377-84 (1978); Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101-02 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 222-28 (1977).
114. For example, due to the complexity of Illinois class action practice, counsel for plantiff
in Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978), stated that the action
would not have been brought in state court. Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction:
Hearingson S. 2094, S. 2389 & H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 180
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
115. 437 U.S. at 368.
116. Id. at 369. For a discussion of the decision of the court of appeals, see Note,
JurisdictionalRequirements for Plaintiff's Claim Against Impleaded Third-PartyDefendant,
26 U. KAN. L. REv. 493 (1978). See also The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. Rav. 1,
241-53 (1978).
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complete diversity between each plaintiff and each defendant mandated dismissal of the third-party defendant. 17 The Court held that
ancillary jurisdiction could not be expanded to cover the case. In
doing so, the Court rejected the arguments that the jurisdiction of
federal courts should be flexible so that the entire lawsuit might be
118
decided in one action.
Once again the Supreme Court rejected arguments of convenience
or economy in determining jurisdiction. In Owen, of course, the
question was subject matter and not personal jurisdiction, but the
result was the same. The Court stated that plaintiffs, in cases such
as Owen, had recourse in state courts."' The Court may have exaggerated, because in some instances no court has jurisdiction over the
diverse parties. For example, joint and several tortfeasors may not
have minimum contacts with any one state. One might be injured
in one state and negligently treated for the injuries in another. Following Shaffer's requirement of minimum contacts for each defendant, no court could hear the claims against the diverse tortfeasors
at once.' As recognized by Justices White and Brennan who dissented in Owen, this rule does not serve considerations of judicial
economy 1I
The ProposedAbolition of Diversity Jurisdiction
There is a move in Congress to abolish federal diversity jurisdiction altogether.2 2 The Senate hearings on the bills to abolish diversity jurisdiction concentrate on the expense in money and man117. 437 U.S. at 377.
118. Id. at 376-77. The Court stated:
It is not unreasonable to assume that, in generally requiring complete diversity, Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of federal courts so
inflexibly that they are unable to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an
entire logically entwined lawsuit. Those practical needs are the basis of the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. But neither the convenience of litigants nor
considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff's cause of action against a citizen of the
same state in a diversity case.
Id. at 377.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
121. 437 U.S. at 377-84 (White & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
122. See Hearings, supra note 114, at 3, 5, 10 (reproductions of S. 2094, S. 2389 & H.R.
9622).
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power that diversity jurisdiction creates.' = Chief Justice Burger has
written and spoken for its abolition.124 Only a few speakers, such as
representatives of the American Trial Lawyers' Association, have
made sporadic references to the need for diversity jurisdiction to
handle mass tort cases, to avoid multiple filings, and to permit
consolidations among various districts.i2
The common thread running through Shaffer, Owen, Zahn, and
the move to abolish diversity jurisdiction is a desire to return to an
older vision of America where the states were seen as independent
entities, capable of adjudicating matters within their own domain,
and free of federal interference or takeover of their judicial function.
Kurland's proposition-that the restrictions of state jurisdiction in
Hanson were an affirmance of state sovereignty-also applies to the
Shaffer decision. The diminution of federal jurisdiction over state
parties in Zahn and Owen is consistent with this line of reasoning.
The abolition of diversity would be an ultimate solution to the
"problem" of the federal courts' adjudication of state issues.

A PROPOSED FEDERAL SOLUTION-THE ALI PROPOSAL
The problem the litigant and the judicial system face is to resolve
the many controversies which are not localized in one state. Modem
transportation and communication have broken the barriers of state
lines. Some mechanism should be found to permit jurisdiction over
all the defendants at once. Since Shaffer and Kulko, the states have
been prevented from providing such a mechanism. Justice Traynor's concept of nationwide state service of process has been rejected. A federal solution therefore must be found.
An expansion of federal jurisdiction in multi-party diversity litigation that would solve such problems has been proposed by the
American Law Institute (ALI) 2I The proposal, as set out in chapter
123. See Hearings, supra note 114.
124. 1977 Report of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the American Bar Assocation,

reported in 45 U.S.L.W 2408 (March 1, 1977); Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Senator
Hruska (May 29, 1975), reprinted in Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures:Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D.
195, 394-99 (1975).

125. Hearings,supra note 114, at 135-36, 141, 167, 180-81.
126. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
(1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY].

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
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160 of the American Law Institute,Study of the Divisionof Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, is described belowThe proposals for revision of general diversity jurisdiction are
accompanied by a projected new head of diversity jurisdiction, to
provide a federal forum for actions in which the state courts cannot do adequate justice because parties are dispersed beyond the
reach of any single state. Under the proposed new Chapter 160
of Title 28, there would be original federal jurisdiction over
any action in which the defendants necessary for a just adjudication of a plaintiffs claim are not all amenable to the process of
any one state court, and m which (as should almost invariably
be the case) there is some diversity of citizenship between adverse
parties. Removal jurisdiction would be provided, on the basis of
similar diversity, when a defendant in a state court action cannot
bring into that court all parties whose presence is necessary for a
just adjudication as to him. In either event, process in actions
under this head of jurisdiction would be authorized to bring in all
necessary parties from wherever they might be, without regard to
state boundaries.'2
127. Id. at 3-4. The proposed chapter 160 follows:
§ 2371. Dispersed necessary parties; original diversity
of citizenshipjurisdiction
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in
which the several defendants who are necessary for a just adjudication of the
plaintiff's claim are not all amenable to process of any one territorial junsdiction, and one of any two adverse parties is a citizen of a State and the other is

a citizen or subject of another territorial jurisdiction.
(b) A defendant is necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim,
within the meaning of this chapter, if complete relief cannot be accorded the
plaintiff in his absence, or if it appears that, under federal law or relevant State
law, an action on the claim would have to be dismissed if he could not be joined
as a party. Persons against whom several liability is asserted shall not be
deemed necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim because liability
is asserted against them jointly or alternatively as well.
(c) A person is amenable to process of a territorial jurisdiction, for the pur-

poses of this section, if, and only if, that person(1) being an individual, has his domicile or an established residence or his
principal place of employment or business activity in that jurisdiction; or
(2) being a corporation or other entity sued as such, is incorporated or has
its principal office in that jurisdiction; or

(3) has an agent in that jurisdiction authorized by appointment to receive
service of process; or
(4) may, under the laws of that jurisdiction, be subjected to a fully effective judgment of its courts without delivery of process within the territorial
jurisdiction to such person or the agent of such person authorized by appointment to receive it.
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§ 2372. Venue in original actions under dispersed
parties diversity of citizenshipjurisdiction
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded solely on section 2371 of
this title may be brought only in a district where a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or where a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated, except that if there is no
such district within the United States, the action may be brought in any district
where any party resides.
(b) For purposes of this section, a corporation shall be regarded as a resident
of the district where it has its principal place of business and also of each district
in every State by which it has been incorporated if its principal place of business
is not in that State, and a partnership or other unincorporated association shall
be regarded as a resident of the district where it has its principal place of
business.
§ 2373. Dispersedparties diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction; removal of actions brought
in State courts
(a) A civil action commenced in a State court in which one of (sic) more
additional parties necessary for a just adjudication as to a defendant cannot be
joined or with the exercise of reasonable diligence served with process or otherwise made subject to a fully effective judgment of the courts of that State, may
be removed by any adversely affected defendant to the district court for the
district embracing the place where such action is pending if one of any two
adverse parties is a citizen of a State and the other is a citizen or subject of
another territorial jurisdiction.
In actions wherein jurisdiction is founded on this section, the word "parties"
as used in this chapter includes all persons named in the petition for removal
as necessary for a just adjudication as to the defendant, whether or not such
persons were named or joined as parties in the action in the State court.
(b) A person is necessary for a just adjudication as to a defendant, within
the meaning of this chapter, if he claims or may claim an interest relating to
the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may leave the defendant subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. A person is not thus necessary for
a just adjudication simply because he is or may be liable to a defendant for all
or part of the plaintiffs claim against the defendant.
(c) A counterclaim asserted in a State court arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiffs claim shall be deemed an action for purposes
of this section, and if the requirements hereof are met, the entire State court
action may be removed. For the purpose of determining whether absent persons
are necessary for a just adjudication of such a counterclaim, a plaintiff in the
State court shall be considered as a defendant under sub-section (b) of this
section, and a defendant therein as a plaintiff under subsection (b) of section
2371 of this title; for all other purposes of removing such action, including the
procedural steps therefor, original plaintiffs or defendants may be deemed defendants.
A counterclaim asserted in a State court that does not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim shall be deemed an action for
the purposes of this section and may be removed by a plaintiff in the State court
action if as a defendant he would have been able to remove under sub-sections
(a) and (b) of this section.
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(d) A petition for removal under this section shall contain a statement that
every reasonable effort has been made by or on behalf of the removing party to
have each absent person who is necessary for a just adjudication as to him made
a party and served with process of otherwise made subject to a fully effective
judgment in the State court.
(e) In an action where jurisdiction is founded solely on this section, if there
is a State court in which an action on the claim may be maintained and to whose
process all parties necessary for a just adjudication are answerable or agree to
submit, the district court on motion of any party or on its own motion may stay
proceedings before it pending prosecution of an action on the claim in the courts
of that State. In determining whether to stay proceedings for this purpose, the
district court shall take into account, m addition to the convenience of parties
and witnesses, whether the rules for decision of the action of any substantial part
thereof are the laws of the State in whose courts the action would be prosecuted
during pendency of the stay and the reasons why the action was not commenced
in that State court originally. The decision of a district court staying proceedings or refusing to dissolve a stay under this subsection shall not be reviewable
on appeal or otherwise except as provided in section 1292(c) of this title.
§ 2374. Process and procedure in actions under
dispersed parties diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction
In any action within this chapter(a) The district court shall, except as otherwise provided m this section, on
motion issue its process for all parties necessary for a just adjudication and shall
have power to restrain them until further order of the court from instituting or
prosecuting any proceeding m any State or United States court relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action. Such process may run
anywhere within the territorial limits of the United States and anywhere outside
those territorial limits that process of the United States may reach, and shall
be returnable at such time as the court directs.
(b) For the convenience of parties and witnesses or otherwise in the interest
of justice, a district court may, on motion of any party or on its own motion,
transfer the action to any other district. The exercise of discretion by the district
court on such a motion is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. If the action is
transferred at the same time that process is issued under this section, such
process shall be made returnable in the district court for the district to which
the action is transferred.
(c) Whenever State law supplies the rule of decision on an issue, the district
court may make its own determination as to which State rule of decision is
applicable.
(d) If one or more absent parties cannot be effectively served with process
issuing under this section, the district court shall order that the action proceed
without such parties unless it is satisfied that greater injustice would be caused
by proceeding without them than by total failure of the action.
(e) If the application of this section would lead to undue burden on distant
parties, and the adverse effect of such disposition does not exceed the sum or
value of $5,000 for any party, the district court may in its discretion:
(1) dismiss without prejudice as to any party or parties upon whom process has been or would have to be served outside the State where the action is
to be litigated, and order that the action proceed without such parties; or
(2) if it is satisfied that, in view of the small amounts involved, greater
injustice would be caused by any continuation of the proceedings than by total
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Briefly, proposed section 2371 would grant federal jurisdiction
where defendants necessary for just adjudication are dispersed befailure of the action, dismiss the entire action without prejudice.
(f) An order that the action proceed without one or more parties necessary
for a just adjudication may be conditioned upon the taking of appropriate measures, including the shaping of relief or other provisions in the judgment, for the
protection of interests that may be affected thereby. Such an order may be
.entered under subsection (d) or (e) of this section even though under federal law
or any relevant State law an action on the claim could not otherwise be maintained without joining the absent parties.
§ 2375. Definitions in actions under dispersed
parties and interpleader diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction
For the purposes only of this chapter and of chapter 159 of this title(a) a corporation incorporated by more than one territorial jurisdiction shall
be deemed to be a citizen only of one of those jurisdictions that will establish
diversity of citizenship between the corporation and a party adverse to it; a
partnership or other unincorporated association shall be deemed to be a citizen
of the territorial jurisdiction where it has its principal place of business;
(b) the term "territorial jurisdiction" means any State or any foreign state;
(c) the word "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and any Territory or Possession of the United States;
(d) the word "citizen" includes a State or other territorial jurisdiction or a
sub-division thereof, but nothing herein shall be construed to affect sovereign
immunity;
(e) a judgment is "fully effective" if it binds a party personally or operates
on property within the jurisdiction of the court to an extent sufficient fully to
satisfy the claim.
§ 2376. Dispersed necessary parties in actions
in district court under other
jurisdictionalstatutes
(a) In a civil action instituted in the district court originally under section
1301 of this title, if one or more additional parties necessary for a just adjudication as to a defendant (as defined in section 2373 of this title) cannot otherwise
be joined, section 2374 of this title shall be applicable to such action; such
parties may be joined under the provisions of that section without regard to their
citizenship; and venue otherwise proper shall be unaffected by, and shall be
proper as to, any such parties.
(b) In a civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded solely on diversity of
citizenship under section 1301 of this title, if a counter-claim compulsory under
the applicable rule is asserted and one or more additional parties necessary for
a just adjudication of that claim as to any present party cannot otherwise be
joined, section 2374 of this title shall be applicable to such action; such parties
may be joined under the provisions of that section without regard to their citizenship; and venue otherwise proper shall be unaffected by, and shall be proper
as to, any such parties. A party is necessary for a just adjudication of a counterclaim as to a present party, for purposes of this subsection, if he would be thus
necessary, under section 2371 or 2373 of this title, in an original action on the
same claim.
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yond the reach of any one state and where minimal diversity exists.
Under the ALI plan, these defendants would have to be necessary
parties, not merely joint-and-several tortfeasors. 12 Perhaps the ALI
proposal could be liberalized to cover "permissive parties," those
who bear a logical relationship to the lawsuit. Section 2372 locates
venue only in districts that have sufficient contacts with the subject
matter of the suits. 2 ' Section 2373 allows certain plaintiffs and defendants to remove a suit in state court to a federal district court. '3,
Section 2374(a) provides for worldwide service of process and for
orders restraining conflicting lawsuits. Section 2374(b) provides for
a transfer to a more convenient forum. If the amount in controversy
is less than $5,000, section 2374(e) gives the district court the discre3
tion to dismiss part or all of the action.' '
Some questions might arise concerning the constitutionality of
nationwide service of process. Yet, Congress has provided for nationwide service of process in several instances,'32 and commentators
and cases almost uniformly assume their constitutionality ,33 An
ALI memorandum 34 in support of the proposal for multi-state,
multi-party litigation argued that "most existing authority
declares with absolute certainty that Congress has general power to
make the process of a federal court run throughout the nation. ' ') 35
128. See note 127 supra.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Congress has provided for service of process, regardless of contacts with the state in
which a district court is located, by the 100-mile bulge provision for service on third-party
defendants, FED. R. Civ. P 4(e) (1966). Nationwide service of process is provided for additional parties in actions in antitrust, 15 U.S.C.A. § 5 (West 1973), and to enjoin antitrust
violations. Id. § 25. All parties claiming an interest under veteran's insurance benefits may
be joined in one lawsuit. 38 U.S.C.A. § 784(a) (West 1979). Process may be served anywhere
to enforce a lien or remove a lien or cloud upon title. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1655 (West 1966). District
courts have nationwide service of process m actions to enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2321 (West 1978 & Supp. 1979). Nationwide service of
process also exists in interpleader actions. Id. § 2361 (1978). Service in securities cases may
be had wherever the defendant is an inhabitant or may be found, and the suit may be
brought where the offer or sale took place. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77 (a), 78aa (West 1971).
133. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouiTs § 64, at 304-05 (3d
ed. 1976); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction:Positive Side Effects and Potential for
Further Reforms, 95 HARv. L. REV. 963, 1004-06 (1979). But see Abraham, Constitutional
Limitations Upon the TerritorialReach of FederalProcess, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963).
134. Memorandum B, ALI STUDY, supra note 126, at 437.
135. Id.
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It cited several statements to that effect by the Supreme Court,
lower federal courts, and commentators,' and it disagreed with a
statement by Justice Black that federal courts in diversity exercise
only the judicial power of the several states. 37 It noted that the
framers of the Constitution proposed the creation of a judicial district which crossed state lines and that during 1801 such a federal
district actually existed. 3 ' The memorandum ended:
[T]he purpose [of] the diversity of citizenship clause of Article
III was most likely that of enabling Congress to assure the availability of adequate and effective judicial relief to those who entered into transactions outside their home state. It seems clear
that in present day context the greatest need for federal courts
in this regard is precisely to handle cases beyond the effective
reach of state courts. From this aspect, Congressional power to
authorize nationwide service of process in diversity cases is necessary to carry out presently the essential purposes of the original
constitutional grant.'39
The desirability of the ALI proposal has been questioned in several articles.'40 Yet, each of these, in stating that there is no real need
for enactment of the proposed statute, based its conclusion on a
jurisdictional model of expanding state jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court recently has restricted the reach of the state courts. In a
concurrent development, by limiting pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, it has limited the relief available to plaintiffs in multi-party
situations. Presently, there is a need for a statute such as that
proposed by the ALI.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has rejected the quasi in rem and the interstate venue theories of state jurisdiction. It also has required more
than a minimal amount of contacts to support jurisdiction. The
holdings of Shaffer and Kulko are fascinating theoretically, but they
136. Id. at 438, nn.4-6.
137. Id. at 438-40, citing National Equip. Co. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 331 (1964) (Black,
J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 440.
139. Id. at 441.
140. E.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICMON: A GENERAL VIEW 4-5 (1973); Currie, The
FederalCourts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1968); Seeburger, The
FederalLong-Arm: The Uses of Diversity,.or 'Tain't So, McGee, 10 IND. L. REv. 480 (1977).

HeinOnline -- 21 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 188 1979-1980

1979]

THE SHRINKING FORUM

189

have a practical import affecting modem procedure. Prior to these
cases, unitary adjudication was possible. Now in many circumstances lawsuits must be fragmented into several suits against
groups of individual defendants. Certainly Shaffer itself is an example of the type of case that might not be adjudicated in one place.
By limiting ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
has impaired further the concept of unitary adjudication.
Now that the Supreme Court has contracted the limits of state
and federal jurisdiction, there is a demonstrable need for the unitary
federal forum. The ALI proposal, or a similar federal statute, should
be adopted in order to provide a forum for the resolution of multiparty, multi-state issues.
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